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Abstract
Using Heijenoort’s unpublished generalized rules of quantification, we discuss the
proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in the form of Heijenoort’s correction
of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” and present a didactic example. Although we are
mainly concerned with the inner structure of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem
and the questions of its quality and its depth, we also discuss the outer questions of
its historical context and why Bernays called it “the central theorem of predicate
logic” and considered the form of its expression to be “concise and felicitous”.
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31 Motivation
When working on our handbook article [Wirth &al., 2009] on Herbrand’s work in logic,
we were fascinated by the following three points:
Herbrand’s Unification Algorithm
In addition to Heijenoort’s reprint of Herbrand’s PhD thesis in [Herbrand,
1968], on which also the standard translation of the 1960s by Dreben and Heijen-
oort in [Heijenoort, 1971], [Herbrand, 1971] is based, we accessed the original
print [Herbrand, 1930]. For some unknown reason, Herbrand’s unification algo-
rithm in the reprint [Herbrand, 1968] has the confusing wording “égalités associées”
instead of the original “égalités normales”. Based on the correct original text, our
English translation of Herbrand’s unification algorithm resulted in a modern equa-
tional formulation, which is more lucid than the one of Dreben and Heijenoort
and strongly supports the thesis of [Abeles, 1994] that Herbrand’s unification al-
gorithm is very close to the equational unification algorithm of [Martelli & Mon-
tanari, 1982].1
Heijenoort’s correction of Herbrand’s “False Lemma”
We were surprised that Heijenoort’s lucid and modern correction of Herbrand’s
“False Lemma” in [Heijenoort, 1975] was still unpublished.
Herbrand’s Construction of Linear First-Order Derivations
We were fascinated by that part of the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem
which shows how to construct a linear derivation of a first-order formula A, given as
input (besides A) only the natural number n such that A has the purely sentential
Property C of order n.
Here, “linear” means that the derivation does not contain any inference step with
more than one premise (such as an application of modus ponens), such that it has no
branching when it is viewed as a tree. Moreover, all function and predicate symbols
within this proof occur already in A, and all formulas in the proof are similar to A
in the sense that they have the so-called “sub-formula” property w.r.t. A.
As a consequence of this linearity, Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus and
Gentzen’s classical sequent calculus represent first steps toward human-orientation
in the sense that a human being with a semantical understanding of an informal proof
has a good chance to construct a formal proof in these calculi.2
1Note that that thesis of [Abeles, 1994] seems to have been developed without access to the uncon-
torted original [Herbrand, 1930]. While our translation may well be influenced by our knowledge of
the development of unification algorithms in the 1970s (see [Martelli & Montanari, 1982], [Paterson
& Wegman, 1978] for references), we noticed the article [Abeles, 1994] only after our translation had
already been completed.
2Calculi that are both human- and machine-oriented are in demand for the synergetic combination of
mathematicians and computing machines in interactive theorem proving systems with strong automation
support [Wirth, 2012c].
4We think that Herbrand’s construction of modus ponens-free proofs should be part
of the standard education of every logician, just as well as the famous construction
of Cut-free proofs according to Gentzen’s Hauptsatz [Gentzen, 1935], wherein
Gentzen— some years later — picked up Herbrand’s idea of formal proofs without
detours in a different form.
The last two items are strongly connected because the calculus of Heijenoort’s correction
makes Herbrand’s construction of linear first-order derivations particularly elegant and
noteworthy.
Therefore, we will present in this paper a novel elaboration of the last two points.
2 Introduction
Before we start, let us briefly mention the complementarity of the lives of Jacques Her-
brand (1908–1931) and Jean van Heijenoort (1912–1986): Herbrand had created a
significant part of the world heritage of modern logic when he died in 1931. Heijenoort
became the leading conservator and splendid commentator and translator of the world
heritage of modern logic in the 1960s, and realized it as a field for historical studies.
The scope of work on history ranges from the gathering and documenting of facts over
interpretation, translation, commentation, and the speculation on the gaps in the docu-
mented facts, up to the manipulation of knowledge on history for politics or for efficient
didactics, such as in the notes on history in natural-science textbooks [Kuhn, 1962, §XIII].
Heijenoort’s interest in history partly resulted from his involvement into politics and
his realization of the contortion of knowledge for the manipulation of society [Feferman,
1993a; 1993b]. His work on the mathematics on Marx and Engels [Heijenoort, 1986a]
obviously had the intention to free himself and the society from this kind of manipulation.
Our main subject in this paper is how Heijenoort himself has slightly manipulated the
historical facts on Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, mostly in his papers [Heijenoort,
1975; 1992], which he did not properly publish himself, but also in his published paper
[Heijenoort, 1986b]. In these papers, Heijenoort changed the inference rules of Her-
brand’s modus ponens-free calculus (which we will present in § 8), probably for didactical
reasons. We think that Heijenoort wanted to put more emphasis on the elegance of
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem and to correct Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in a more
reasonable way than Bernays, Gödel, and Dreben did.
Regarding Heijenoort’s merits in publishing, translating, and commenting Her-
brand’s original work,3 we have absolutely no reason to blame Heijenoort for this slight
manipulation. Our motivation here is a different one: We will discuss the inference system
resulting from Heijenoort’s changes to Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus in detail
in §§ 3–7 (and also present an up-to-date free-variable version of it), because it helps us
to put Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem into a new light, emphasizing its elegance and
practical and theoretical relevance.
3See [Herbrand, 1968; 1971] and [Heijenoort, 1971] for Heijenoort’s publishing, translating, and
commenting of Herbrand’s work as a logician. Moreover, see [Heijenoort, 1982; 1986b; 1992] for
Heijenoort’s secondary discussion of Herbrand’s work as a logician.
5We think that Herbrand’s work in logic still deserves to be even more widely known
than it is today. We also think that our partly didactical intentions in this paper go well
together with Heijenoort’s original ones regarding his work on Herbrand.
The still contentious assessment ofHerbrand’s Fundamental Theorem is also expressed
at the end of the following text, written by Sol Feferman (*1928) in 1993,4 which also
serves as a further introduction into our subject:
“Herbrand’s fundamental theorem from his 1930 dissertation gives a kind of
reduction, in the limit, of quantificational logic to propositional logic. This has
led to considerable further work in proof theory, among which the most note-
worthy is that of Gerhard Gentzen (beginning in 1934); it has also been
used in recent years as the basis for an approach to automated deduction. How-
ever Herbrand’s own proofs were flawed; already in 1939 Bernays remarked
that “Herbrand’s proof is hard to follow”, and in 1943, Gödel uncovered an
essential gap, though his notes on this were never published. Counter-examples
to two important lemmas in Herbrand were produced by Burton Dreben
in collaboration with his students and colleagues Peter Andrews and Stål
Aanderaa in an article in 1963, in which they outlined how the arguments
could be repaired. A detailed proof of the crucial lemma was later given by
Dreben and John Denton in 1966.
Despite the known flaws, van Heijenoort regarded Herbrand’s theorem
as one of the deepest results of logic. (In the minds of most logicians that
assessment is debatable, but the importance of the theorem is undeniable.)”
[Feferman, 1993b, p. 383, Note 11 omitted]
We will refer to that “crucial lemma” as “Herbrand’s ‘False Lemma’ ” and discuss it in § 9.
After having made all that material most obvious, we will not be able to avoid the debate
on the depth and centrality ofHerbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in § 10, supporting some
of the well-known assessments of Heijenoort, Bernays, and Feferman.
We will conclude our paper with § 11.
4Today, however, there is better information available on the work of Gerhard Gentzen (1909–1945)
in [Menzler-Trott, 2001; 2007], and Gödel’s notes on Herbrand’s “False Lemma” have been published
in [Goldfarb, 1993].
63 Herbrand’s Modus Ponens -Free Calculus
in the Eyes of Heijenoort [1975]
When Heijenoort refers to Herbrand’s calculus in [Heijenoort, 1982; 1986b; 1992],
he actually describes his own calculus of [Heijenoort, 1975], which lacks Herbrand’s
rules of passage and compensates this with generalized versions of the rules of quantifica-
tion.5
Partly as a further introduction to our subject, we will now quote from Heijenoort’s
unpublished draft paper [Heijenoort, 1975], but — as a few of Heijenoort’s tech-
nical terms are awkward and vary from paper to paper — we will replace them in our
quotations consistently with modern terminology,6 based on the classification of reductive
inference rules by Raymond M. Smullyan (*1919) into α (sentential+non-branching),
β (sentential+branching), γ, and δ, cf. [Smullyan, 1968].
“In 1929 Jacques Herbrand stated a theorem that, as Bernays [1957] writes,
is ‘the central theorem of predicate logic’. The theorem has many applications,
one of them being a new approach to the problem of ascertaining the validity
of a formula.
Herbrand’s theorem, stated in a general form, is this: Given a formula F of
classical quantification theory, we can effectively generate an infinite sequence
of quantifier-free formulas F1, F2, . . . , such that F is provable in (any standard
system of) quantification theory if and only if there is a k such that Fk is (sen-
tentially) valid; moreover, F can be retrieved from Fk through applications of
some rules that have remarkable properties. There are several ways of gener-
ating an adequate sequence of quantifier-free formulas; and, moreover, many
details can vary; here we shall consider two kinds of sequences: expansions and
disjunctions.
We consider a system Q adequate for classical quantification theory, without
identity, in which the sentential connectives are negation, disjunction, and
conjunction. A formula of Q is rectified if and only if it contains no vacu-
ous quantifier, no variable has free and bound occurrences in it, and no two
quantifiers bind occurrences of the same variable. A quantifier in a rectified
formula is γ if and only if it is existential and in the scope of an even number of
negation symbols, or universal and in the scope of an odd number of negation
symbols; otherwise the quantifier is δ. (A γ-quantifier turns up as existential
in a prenex form of the formula, and a δ-quantifier as universal.) A variable in
a rectified formula is γ if and only if it is bound by a γ-quantifier; it is | δ if and
only if it is free or bound by a δ-quantifier. (Herbrand uses ‘restreint’ for ‘γ’
and ‘general’ for ‘δ’; in work on Herbrand’s theorem in English ‘restricted’
and ‘general’ have been used.)
A quantifier is accessible in a formula F if and only if it is in the scope of no
quantifier of F. A variable is accessible in a formula if and only if it is either
free or bound by an accessible quantifier.”
[Heijenoort, 1975, pp. 1–2. See our Note 6]
7Note that both Herbrand and Heijenoort consider equality of formulas only up to
renaming of bound variables and often implicitly assume that a formula is rectified.
As Heijenoort’s three-rule inference system is difficult to understand and not complete
in the given form, let us present each of the rules twice in the following sub-sections: first
in quotation of [Heijenoort, 1975], second in a hopefully more readable transcription.
Note that the three rules can be understood as operating on rectified formulas only, but
this is not necessary for their soundness.
3.1 γ-Quantification
Heijenoort writes:
“To pass from F
(
Qx. H / H(x/t)
)
, where Qx. is an accessible γ-quantifier
of F, H is the scope of Qx., and t is a term of the system, to F. ”
[Heijenoort, 1975, p. 4. See our Note 6]
Herein “H(x/t) ” denotes a capture-avoiding replacement of all occurrences of x in H with t,
where those bound variables in H are renamed whose quantifiers would otherwise capture
free variables in t.
Let A[. . .] be the context such that Heijenoort’s F is A[Qx. H ]. Moreover, let us
write “H{x 7→ t} ” for the result of the replacement of all occurrences of x in H with t
(without renaming). Then we get the following formulation.
5Indeed, Herbrand did not have any generalized rules of quantification; so Herbrand additionally
needed his rules of passage to achieve completeness, resulting in a calculus of at least four rules. Therefore,
Heijenoort definitely refers to his own three-rule calculus when he writes:
“A second result ofHerbrand, connected with the first, is that the formula F can be recovered
from the formula Fk by means of three rules of a very definite character. These rules are
the generalized rule of γ-quantification, the generalized rule of δ−-quantification and the
generalized rule of simplification.” [Heijenoort, 1986b, p. 99. See our Note 6]
And, one page later, Heijenoort explicitly declares his own three-rule calculus to be Herbrand’s achieve-
ment in history:
“The system based on Herbrand’s three rules is, historically, the first example of what
we call today a cut-free system; it also has the so-called subformula property.”
[Heijenoort, 1986b, p. 100]
6Besides adding a dot after Heijenoort’s quantifiers, this means that the following technical terms
will be tacitly rewritten when quoting [Heijenoort, 1975; Heijenoort, 1986b]:
Heijenoort [1975] Heijenoort [1986b] Heijenoort [1992] Our wording here
existentialoid existentialoid restricted γ
existentialoid quantifier γ-quantifier
Rule of existentialoid Generalized rule of Rule of Generalized rule of
quantification existentialization existentialization γ-quantification
Rule of simplification Generalized rule of Rule of Generalized rule of
simplification simplification simplification
Rule of universaloid Generalized rule of Rule of Generalized rule of
quantification universalization universalization δ−-quantification
universaloid universaloid nonrestricted δ
universaloid quantifier δ-quantifier
8Generalized rule of γ-quantification:
A[H{x 7→ t}]
A[Qx. H ]
where
1. Qx. is an accessible7 γ-quantifier of A[Qx. H ], and
2. the free variables of the term t must8 not be bound by quantifiers in H.
Example 3.1 (Application of the generalized rule of γ-quantification)
If the variable z does not occur free in the term t, we get the following two inference steps
with identical premises by application of the generalized rule of γ-quantification at two
different positions:
•
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬∀z. (t≺ z)
(t≺ t) ∨ ∃x. ¬∀z. (x≺ z)
via the meta-level substitution
{ A[. . .] 7→ (t≺ t) ∨ [. . .], H 7→ ¬∀z. (x≺ z), Q 7→ ∃ };
•
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬∀z. (t≺ z)
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬∀x. ∀z. (x≺ z)
via the meta-level substitution
{ A[. . .] 7→ (t≺ t) ∨ ¬[. . .], H 7→ ∀z. (x≺ z), Q 7→ ∀ }. 
Today’s calculi for proof search have an additional kind of free variables, called “free vari-
ables” in [Fitting, 1996], [Wirth, 2013], or “(free) γ-variables” in [Wirth, 2004; 2008].
We will mark such a variable with the upper index γ, such as in “xγ”. By taking the
meta-variable t of the generalized rule of γ-quantification to be such a free γ-variable, these
free-variable calculi admit us to delay the choice of the witnessing term t in a backward
application of the generalized rule of γ-quantification in reductive proof search. Later,
when the state of the reductive proof attempt provides sufficient information which witness
is promising, the free γ-variable can be globally instantiated in the whole proof tree.
Although free-variable calculi can still use the generalized rule of γ-quantification in the
previous formulation, we will refer several times to the following sub-rule:
Generalized rule of restricted γ-quantification:
A[H{x 7→ xγ}]
A[Qx. H ]
where
Qx. is an accessible γ-quantifier of A[Qx. H ].
7The restriction of accessibility of the introduced quantifier in the generalized rule of γ-quantification
is not necessary for soundness (contrary to the generalized rule of δ−-quantification). This restriction is
introduced, however, because already the restricted rule suffices for completeness and for the constructions
in the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem. Moreover, the restriction of accessibility guarantees
the equivalence of the generalized rules of quantification with their non-generalized versions via the rules
of passage; cf. [Heijenoort, 1968, p. 6].
8If a variable z is bound by quantifiers inH (as in Example 3.1) and occurs free in the term t (in violation
of Side-Condition 2), an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences of z in H is admitted to enable a
backward (i.e. reductive) application of the generalized rule of γ-quantification. Note that this is never
required for reductive proof search if the formula A[Qx. H ] is rectified, because then, in case of violation
of Side-Condition 2, the variable z cannot occur in A[. . .], and thus choosing another name for z in t can
circumvent the renaming of bound occurrences of z in H — without destroying the property of being a
(completed) formal proof later on, provided that this other name is chosen instead of z
93.2 δ-Quantification
Heijenoort writes:
“To pass from F
(
Qy. H / H
)
, where Qy. is an accessible δ-quantifier of F,
H is the scope of Qy., and y does not occur free in F, to F. ”
[Heijenoort, 1975, p. 4. See our Note 6]
Let A[. . .] be the context such that Heijenoort’s F is A[Qy. H ]. Then we get the following
formulation.
Generalized rule of δ−-quantification:
A[H ]
A[Qy. H ]
where
1. Qy. is an accessible δ-quantifier of A[Qy. H ], and
2. the variable y must9 not occur free in the context A[. . .].
For soundness reasons, free-variable calculi (i.e. calculi with free γ-variables) need a differ-
ent rule of δ-quantification. We take here a generalized version of the so-called δ+
+
-rule
[Beckert &al., 1993]. This δ+
+
-rule is a liberalized δ-rule in the sense that, compared
to the simple δ-rule (also called δ−-rule), it admits additional proofs that are more easily
found by man and machine. (See § 5.4, and also [Wirth, 2004, § 2.1.5], [Wirth, 2006].)
Generalized rule of δ+
+
-quantification:
A[H{y 7→ (Qy. H, xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m)
δ(xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m)}]
A[Qy. H ]
where
1. Qy. is an accessible δ-quantifier of A[Qy. H ],
2. xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m are exactly the m free γ-variables occurring in Qy. H, and
3. the δ in (Qy. H, xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m)
δ denotes the application of the function δ
to (Qy. H, xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m), resulting in a function symbol of arity m that is
not part of the original signature, such that, in case of (B, xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m)
δ =
(C, zγ1, . . . , z
γ
m′)
δ, either (C, zγ1, . . . , z
γ
m′) is (Bx
γ
1, . . . , x
γ
m), or C results
from B by renaming of bound variables and by a bijective renaming of
the free γ-variables xγ1, . . . , x
γ
m via {x
γ
1 7→z
γ
1, . . . , x
γ
m 7→z
γ
m′}.
In case of m=0, i.e. in the absence of free γ-variables, there is no essential difference be-
tween the generalized rules of δ−- and δ+
+
-quantification, except that the δ+
+
-rule may vio-
late Side-Condition 2 of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification (when reductively applied
a second time to the same formula).
9If y occurs in the context A[. . .], an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences of y in Qy. H
is admitted to enable backward (i.e. reductive) application of the inference rule. Note that this is never
required for reductive proof search if the formula A[Qy. H ] is rectified, because then y cannot occur in A[. . .].
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3.3 Simplification
Heijenoort writes:
“To pass from F
(
H / (H ∨ H ′)
)
, where H is a subformula of F and H ′ is
a variant of H, to F. ” [Heijenoort, 1975, p. 4]
To satisfy the needs of the proof construction in Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, we
have to correct Heijenoort’s version a bit: On the one hand, we remove Heijenoort’s
admission of H ∨ H ′ at negative positions (i.e. in the scope of an odd number of negation
symbols), and, on the other hand, we admit also H ∧ H ′ at negative positions.10
Let A[. . .] be the context such that Heijenoort’s F is A[H ]. Then we get the following
formulation.
Generalized rule of simplification:
A[H ◦H ′]
A[H ]
where
1. “◦” stands for “∨” if [. . .] denotes a positive position in A[. . .], and for “∧”
if this position is negative,11 and
2. H ′ is a variant of the sub-formula H (i.e., H ′ is H or can be obtained
from H by the renaming of variables bound in H).
Moreover, the generalized rule of γ-simplification is the sub-rule for the case that H is of
the form Qy. C and Qy. is a γ-quantifier of A[Qy. C].
As the only essential function of the generalized rule of simplification is to increase
γ-multiplicity, the generalized rule of γ-simplification is sufficient for completeness and
for the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem.
10See the formal proof in § 5, where we need the operator “∧” twice at negative positions.
11In the terminology of Smullyan’s classification, this means that ◦ is always an α-operator.
11
4 Property C
4.1 Prerequisites for Property C
Definition 4.1 (Height of a Term, Champ Fini Tn(F ))
We use |t| to denote the height of a term t, which is given by
|f(t1, . . . , tm)| = 1 +max{0, |t1| , . . . , |tm| }.
For a positive natural number n and a formula F , as a finite substitute for a typically
infinite, full term universe, Herbrand uses what he calls a champ fini of order n, which
we will denote with Tn(F ). The terms of Tn(F ) are constructed from the symbols that
occur free in F : the function symbols, the constant symbols (which we will tacitly subsume
under the function symbols in what follows), and the free variable symbols (which can be
seen as constant symbols here). Such a champ fini differs from a full term universe in
containing only the terms t with |t| ≺ n .
So we have T1(F )= ∅.
To guarantee Tn(F ) 6= ∅ for n ≻ 1, in case that neither constants nor free variable
symbols occur in F, we will assume that a fresh constant symbol “•” (which does not occur
elsewhere) is included in the term construction in addition to the free symbols of F . 
Herbrand’s definition of an expansion follows the traditional idea that — for a finite
domain — universal (existential) quantification can be seen as a finite conjunction
(disjunction) over the elements of the domain. To reduce the size of formal proofs according
to Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, we will consider sub-expansions in addition.
Definition 4.2 ([Sub-] Expansion)
Let T be a finite set of terms. To simplify substitution, let A be a rectified formula whose
bound variables do not occur in T . A formula B is a sub-expansion of A w.r.t. T if
A, B, T satisfy the recursive definition of the following table, where “s-e” abbreviates “is a
sub-expansion”:
form of A form of B required properties
quantifier free A —
¬A′ ¬B′ B′ s-e of A′ w.r.t. T
A′1 ∨ A
′
2 B
′
1 ∨ B
′
2 B
′
i s-e of A
′
i w.r.t. T , for i∈{1, 2}
A′1 ∧ A
′
2 B
′
1 ∧ B
′
2 B
′
i s-e of A
′
i w.r.t. T , for i∈{1, 2}
∃x. A′
∨
t∈T ′ B
′{x7→t} B′ s-e of A′ w.r.t. T , and ∅ 6=T ′⊆T
∀x. A′
∧
t∈T ′ B
′{x7→t} B′ s-e of A′ w.r.t. T , and ∅ 6=T ′⊆T
If we restrict T ′ in this table to be equal to T , then we get an expansion B of A (instead
of a sub-expansion B of A) w.r.t. T , and write AT for B. 
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Definition 4.3 (Skolemized Forms)
Let B be a rectified formula.
The δ−-Skolemized form of a formula B (also called: “outer Skolemized form”) results
fromB by removing every δ-quantifier and replacing its bound variable y with yδ(x1, . . . , xm),
where yδ is a fresh (“Skolem”) symbol and x1, . . . , xm, in this order, are exactly the
m variables of the m γ-quantifiers in whose scope the δ-quantifier occurs.
The δ+
+
-Skolemized form of B results from B by repeating the following procedure until
all δ-quantifiers have been removed: Let Qy. be an outermost δ-quantifier in A[Qy. H ] =
B. Replace B with A[H{y 7→ (Qy. H, x1, . . . , xm)
δ(x1, . . . , xm)}], where x1, . . . , xm are
exactly the m variables bound by the m γ-quantifiers in whose scope the δ-quantifier Qx.
occurs and which do actually occur in the scope H of the δ-quantifier. Moreover, the δ
in “(Qy. H, x1, . . . , xm)
δ ” denotes the application of the function δ to (Qy. H, x1, . . . , xm).
The result of this application must be a function symbol of arity m that is not part of
the original signature, such that, in case of (B, x1, . . . , xm)
δ = (C, x′1, . . . , x
′
m′)
δ, either
(C, x′1, . . . , x
′
m′) is (B, x1, . . . , xm), or C results from B by renaming of bound variables
and by a bijective renaming of the free variables x1, . . . , xm via {x1 7→x
′
1, . . . , xm 7→x
′
m′}.

Remark 4.4 (Skolemized Forms)
Herbrand has no name for the δ−-Skolemized form and he does not use the δ+
+
-Skolem-
ized form, which is the current standard in two-valued first-order logic because it is closely
related to the liberalized δ-rules.
We cannot get along without the δ+
+
-Skolemized form here because there is no reasonable
version of the generalized rule of δ+
+
-quantification that is compatible with the δ−-Skolem-
ized form.
Definition 4.5 (Sentential Tautology)
A first-order formula is a sentential tautology if it is quantifier-free and truth-functionally
valid, provided its atomic subformulas are read as atomic sentential variables. 
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4.2 Property C and Property C∗
Definition 4.6 (Property C, Property C∗)
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let n be a positive natural number.
A has Property C of order n if the expansion F Tn(F ) is a sentential tautology, where F is
the δ−-Skolemized form of A.
A has Property C ∗ of order n if the expansion F Tn(F ) is a sentential tautology, where F
is the δ+
+
-Skolemized form of A. 
Note that F T1(F ) is defined if and only if F does not contain any quantifier, because we
have T1(F )= ∅, and because an empty conjunction or disjunction for the expansion of a
quantifier is not admitted in Definition 4.2. Thus, we get the following corollary, which
— to avoid the usage of an undefined term — may also serve as a cleaner definition for
Property C and Property C∗ of order 1.
Corollary 4.7
The following three are logically equivalent for a rectified formula A :
1. A has Property C of order 1.
2. A has Property C ∗ of order 1.
3. The (no matter whether δ−- or δ+
+
-) Skolemized form of A
is a sentential tautology. 
Because all quantifiers in a Skolemized form F are γ-quantifiers, existential quantifiers
occur only at positive positions (and are expanded with disjunctions) and universal quanti-
fiers occur only at negative positions (and are expanded with conjunctions). Thus, we get
the following corollaries:
Corollary 4.8
If any sub-expansion of a Skolemized form F w.r.t. T is a sentential tautology,
then F T is a sentential tautology as well. 
Corollary 4.9
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let n be a positive natural number. If any sub-
expansion of the δ−-Skolemized (or else: δ+
+
-Skolemized) form F of A w.r.t. Tn(F )
is a sentential tautology, then A has Property C (or else: Property C ∗) of order n. 
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By using the idea of Corollary 4.8 for the forward direction and by replacing all terms whose
top function symbols are new with the same old constant or free variable for the backward
direction, we get:
Corollary 4.10
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let n be a positive natural number.
Let F be the δ−-Skolemized (or else: δ+
+
-Skolemized) form of A.
Let T ′ be formed just as Tn(F ), but over an extended set of function symbols.
Now the following two are logically equivalent:
1. A has Property C (or else: Property C ∗) of order n.
2. F T
′
is a sentential tautology. 
As the replacement of δ−-Skolem terms with δ+
+
-Skolem terms, dropping the arguments
at the missing argument positions, cannot increase the range of values of a sentential ex-
pression under all valuations (of its sentential variables named by atomic formulas), we get:
Corollary 4.11 Let A be a rectified formula. Let n be a positive natural number.
If A has Property C of order n, then A has Property C ∗ of order n as well. 
Note that the converse of Corollary 4.11 does not hold in general:
Example 4.12
Let us take A to be the rectified formula ∃a.
(
(¬∃b. p(b)) ∨ p(a)
)
.
Its δ+
+
-Skolemized form is ∃a.
(
¬p(bδ) ∨ p(a)
)
. Now, expansion w.r.t. {bδ} results in
a sentential tautology. Thus, A has Property C∗ of order 2.
Its δ−-Skolemized form is ∃a.
(
¬p(bδ(a)) ∨ p(a)
)
. Here expansion w.r.t. {•} does not
result in a sentential tautology. Thus, A does not have Property C of order 2, but only of
order 3. 
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5 From Property C to a Linear Derivation
In this section, instead of proving our theorems, we will exemplify them by a generalizable
example.
In this example, we add some sugar to our formula syntax. Let us write
“A ⇒ B ”
instead of
“¬A ∨ B ”,
and let “⇒” have lower operator precedence than “∧” and “∨”.
The following formula says that if we have an upper bound of every two elements as
well as transitivity, then we also have an upper bound of every three elements.
∀x. ∀y. ∃m. (x≺m ∧ y≺m)
∧ ∀c. ∀b. ∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
⇒ ∀u. ∀v. ∀w. ∃z. (u≺ z ∧ v≺ z ∧ w≺ z)
(A)
The (δ−- as well as δ+
+
-) Skolemized form of A is
∀x. ∀y. (x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y))
∧ ∀c. ∀b. ∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(F )
5.1 Informal Proof
Let us look for an informal proof of the last line of F , assuming the first two lines to be
given as lemmas. From semantical considerations, it is obvious that a solution for z is given
by the substitution σ3 := {z 7→ m
δ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))}.
We can prove this as follows: First we apply the first line twice instantiated by the two
substitutions σ1,1 := {x 7→ v
δ, y 7→ wδ},
σ1,2 := {x 7→ u
δ, y 7→ mδ(vδ, wδ)}
to obtain all of
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ), wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ),
uδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)), mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)).
Now we can apply the second line twice instantiated by the two substitutions
σ2,1 := σ2 ∪ {a 7→ v
δ},
σ2,2 := σ2 ∪ {a 7→ w
δ}
}
for σ2 := {c 7→ m
δ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)), b 7→ mδ(vδ, wδ)}
to obtain also
vδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)), wδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
which completes our informal proof the last line of formula F.
As the maximum height of the instantiations in this informal proof is 3, it is obvious
that the formula A has Property C of order 4.
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5.2 Human-Oriented Formal Proof Construction in Heijenoort’s
Version of Herbrand’s Modus Ponens -Free Calculus
Let us use this informal proof to construct a formal proof of the formula A in Heijen-
oort’s version of Herbrand’s modus ponens -free calculus, which we presented in § 3.
More precisely, our goal is to reduce the formula A to a sub-expansion of F w.r.t. Tn(F )
(for n=4) that is a sentential tautology; our means will be the renaming of bound variables
and the generalized rules of γ-simplification and δ−- and γ-quantification.
In any of the following reductive backward steps, the parts of a formula that will be
removed will be shown in red and those parts that are crucially involved (but not removed)
are shown in orange. The parts changed w.r.t. the previous formula will be shown in green
if they are crucial for triggering the previous step, and in blue otherwise.
5.2.1 Phase 1 of the Reduction: Rename Bound δ-Variables
First we use an amazing trick invented by Herbrand: We use Skolem terms as names
for bound δ-variables and for the free variables that result from backward application of
the generalized rule of δ−-quantification.
By this trick, Herbrand escapes the problems of giving Skolem functions a semantics
and all involved problems, such as the need for a principle of choice. These problems are
present in [Löwenheim, 1915] and were overcome in [Skolem, 1920; 1923] only by using
Skolem normal form instead of Skolemized form. Skolemized form, however, is more
intuitive and more useful in automated theorem proving than Skolem normal form, and
Skolem returned to Skolemized form in [Skolem, 1928].
According to Herbrand’s trick, every term that has a Skolem function as top symbol
is seen as a variable, such thatmδ(vδ, wδ) is not a subterm ofmδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)), because they
are both just variables. This interpretation does not affect the formula A, simply because
A does not contain any Skolem function symbols.
Thus, we start by renaming each bound δ-variable in A to its Skolem term in the
δ−-Skolemized form F of A, and obtain:
∀x. ∀y. ∃mδ(x, y). (x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y))
∧ ∀c. ∀b. ∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
⇒ ∀uδ. ∀vδ. ∀wδ. ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(S)
Here, in the first line of S, we must not read the occurrences of the variables x and y as
arguments of mδ as variables bound by the outer universal quantifier, but as a part of the
name “mδ(x, y)” of the variable bound by the existential quantifier.
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5.2.2 Phase 2 of the Reduction: Generalized Rule of γ-Simplification
We know from our informal proof that we need the first and the second line twice. Thus,
we now double them at ∀x. and ∀a., respectively, by two backward applications of the
generalized rule of γ-simplification, and obtain:
∀x. ∀y. ∃mδ(x, y). (x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y))
∧ ∀x1. ∀y1. ∃m
δ(x1, y1). (x1≺m
δ(x1, y1) ∧ y1≺m
δ(x1, y1))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∀uδ. ∀vδ. ∀wδ. ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(R)
Note that — to keep our formula rectified — we have added the index 1 to the copies and
also renamed the bound δ-variable mδ(x, y) consistently.
5.2.3 Phase 3 of the Reduction: Generalized Rules of Quantification
Now we have to apply the generalized rules of δ−- and γ-quantification backward until no
quantifiers remain. According to the side-condition of the generalized rule of δ−-quantifi-
cation, we have to guarantee that every δ-quantifier is removed before its variable has been
used for the instantiation of γ-variables. According to the side-condition of the generalized
rule of γ-quantification, we have to guarantee that every term substituted for a γ-variable
does not contain any variables bound in the scope of its γ-quantifier. To satisfy these side-
conditions, we have to remove the accessible quantifiers in the order given by the following
procedure.
Procedure 5.1 (Restricting the Order of the Applications of Generalized
Rules of γ- and δ−-Quantification for Reduction to a Sub-Expansion)
Do the following for every natural number i, stepping (by 1) from 1 to n:
Keep removing
• the accessible γ-quantifiers whose γ-variable is to be instantiated with a
term t with |t| ≺ i (where variables whose names are Skolem terms are
considered to have the height of the Skolem terms) as well as
• the accessible δ-quantifiers,
until no such quantifiers remain. 
Remark 5.2 (Historical Correctness)
For restricting the order of the applications, Herbrand considered only the case of a
reduction to an expansion, not to a proper sub-expansion. The order he described in the
first part of the proof of his Fundamental Theorem [Herbrand, 1930, § 5.5.1] is a complete
one, which — for the case of a full expansion — is one of the orders our Procedure 5.1
admits. If we applied Herbrand’s description directly to sub-expansions, however, there
would be no guarantee that the side-conditions of the applications of the generalized rule
of δ−-quantification are satisfied. Nevertheless, Procedure 5.1 just captures the weakest
condition to satisfy all side-conditions for the reason why Herbrand’s procedure satisfies
them; cf. § 5.2.4. 
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Let us see what our Procedure 5.1 means in case of our example.
For i=1, there cannot be any γ-quantifiers satisfying the condition, because no term can
have height 0. Thus, we apply the generalized rule of δ−-quantification thrice backward to
the last line, and obtain:
∀x. ∀y. ∃mδ(x, y). (x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y))
∧ ∀x1. ∀y1. ∃m
δ(x1, y1). (x1≺m
δ(x1, y1) ∧ y1≺m
δ(x1, y1))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(Q)
Note that the introduced free variables all have height i.
Now, because no accessible δ-quantifiers remain, we increment i by 1.
For i=2, the only accessible γ-quantifiers that are to be instantiated with terms of height
smaller than 2 are x and y in the first line (according to the substitution σ1,1), as well as
x1 of the second line (according to the substitution σ1,2).
Therefore, we apply σ1,1 to all occurrences of x and y in the first line and remove
their γ-quantifiers. Formally this means that we rename the bound δ-variable mδ(x, y) to
mδ(vδ, wδ), and then we apply the generalized rule of γ-quantification twice (backward).
Doing the same to x1 according to the instantiation of the original x in σ1,2, we then obtain
the following formula:
∃mδ(vδ, wδ). (vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ ∀y1. ∃m
δ(uδ, y1). (u
δ≺mδ(uδ, y1) ∧ y1≺m
δ(uδ, y1))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(P )
Now, the only accessible δ-quantifier is “∃mδ(vδ, wδ).” in the first line. Let us remove it by
a backward application of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification, and obtain:
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ)
∧ ∀y1. ∃m
δ(uδ, y1). (u
δ≺mδ(uδ, y1) ∧ y1≺m
δ(uδ, y1))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(O)
Note that the variable of the removed δ-quantifier has height i again.
Now, because all accessible γ-quantifiers are to be replaced with terms of height not
smaller than 2, we increment i by 1.
19
For i=3, according to Procedure 5.1, we now have to apply the generalized rule of
γ-quantification backward to the second line according to the substitution σ1,2 (for the re-
named y1 instead of the original y) (after the involved renaming of the following δ-variable),
because every term in the range of σ1,2 has a height smaller than 3. We obtain:
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ)
∧ ∃mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)).
(uδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(L)
After a subsequent application of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification, we obtain:
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ)
∧ uδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(K)
Note that the variable of the removed δ-quantifier has height i again.
Moreover, note that the free variable mδ(vδ, wδ) occurs twice in the first line but only
once in second line, because the remaining two occurrences are just part of the name of the
free variable mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)). Be reminded that every Skolem function symbol starts a
name of a variable.
Now, as all accessible quantifiers in the formula K are γ-quantifiers whose variables are
to be replaced with terms of height not smaller than 3, we increment i by 1 again.
5.2.4 Interlude: Why Side-Conditions are Always Satisfied
Generalized rule of δ−-quantification
Note that the side-condition of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification (i.e. that its bound
δ-variable does not occur free outside its scope) is observed in the last step from the
formula L back to the formula K.
Let us show that — under the reasonable conditions explained below on the terms
introduced by backward applications of the generalized rule of γ-quantification — this is
always the case for the order of removal of quantifiers given by Procedure 5.1:
If a bound δ-variable is turned into a free variable by the removal of its quantifier by
reductive application of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification according to Procedure 5.1
during the removal of quantifiers for a given i, then its height (seen as a term) must be i.
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Indeed, for i=1, the Skolem function symbol of the variable name whose δ-quantifier
is removed must be a constant, simply because it cannot occur in the scope of γ-quantifiers.
Moreover, for i≻ 1, its Skolem function symbol must have at least one argument of
height i−1, simply because otherwise its δ-quantifier would have been removed already
for a smaller i.
Here it is crucial that we took the δ−-Skolemized form instead of the δ+
+
-Skolem-
ized form: All γ-variables in whose scope the δ-variable occurs must be arguments of the
Skolem term that names the δ-variable.
Now it is immediate that the δ-variable cannot have been introduced as a free variable
by a previous backward application of a generalized rule of γ-quantification, simply because
all such free variables have a height strictly smaller than i.
On the other hand, if the δ-variable was introduced as a free variable by a previous
backward application of a generalized rule of δ−-quantification, then — because it must
have the identical Skolem symbol — this previous application must have occurred in
a parallel branch resulting from our initial backward applications of the generalized rule
of γ-simplification. If, however, we never instantiate the γ-variables of the top quanti-
fiers of different copies introduced by backward applications of the generalized rule of
γ-simplification with identical instances (and there would be no benefit of this), then
we know that the Skolem terms that name the bound δ-variables have different argu-
ments.
Here — for different instances of the γ-variables to result in different Skolem terms —
it is again crucial to have the δ−- instead of the δ+
+
-Skolemized form.
Therefore, the side-condition of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification (i.e. that its
bound δ-variable does not occur free outside its scope) is always observed under reasonable
conditions on the terms introduced by backward applications of the generalized rule of
γ-quantification.
Generalized rule of γ-quantification
In a similar way, we can see that also the side-condition of the generalized rule of
γ-quantification — namely that none of the free variables occurring in the term t substi-
tuted for its bound γ-variable is bound by quantifiers in the scope of the γ-quantification —
is always satisfied under reasonable conditions:
If we do not admit a variable that does not start with a Skolem function symbol in t
unless it occurs free in A (and there would be no benefit of this), then the γ-quantifications
in the scope of the original γ-quantification cannot bind such a variable, simply because A
is assumed to be rectified.
On the other hand, all δ-quantified variables in the scope of the original γ-quantification
contain t as a subterm of their names and thus have a bigger height than all free variables
occurring in t.
Here again it is crucial to have the δ−- instead of the δ+
+
-Skolemized form.
After these general considerations on the side-conditions of the generalized rules of
quantification, let us return to our example proof.
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5.2.5 Continuation of Phase 3
For i=4 (i.e. for i=n), we remove the five γ-quantifiers remaining in the formula K by
the generalized rule of γ-quantification, using σ2,1 for the third line, σ2,2 for the fourth line,
and σ3 for the last line, and obtain the following formula:
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ)
∧ uδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧
(
vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
⇒ vδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
)
∧
(
wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
⇒ wδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
)
⇒

 u
δ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ vδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ wδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))


(J)
Now, considering all atomic formulas of J as names of sentential variables, we easily see that
the formula J is a sentential tautology. Moreover, J is a sub-expansion of the formula F
w.r.t. T4(F ), the champ fini of order 4, formed over the function and free variable symbols
of F , i.e. over uδ, vδ, wδ, and mδ(_,_). Thus, by Corollaries 4.8 and 4.9, the expan-
sion F T4(F ) is a sentential tautology as well, and so A has Property C of order 4.
5.2.6 Stepwise Deductive Construction of the Same Proof?
Suppose we have found a sentential tautology that is a sub-expansion of the δ−-Skolem-
ized form F of A. Can we now construct a proof of A deductively, i.e. stepwise from such
a sentential tautology forward to obtain formula A in the end? Of course, the reductive
construction shows that there must be one such formula where this is possible, but even if
we found a formula where this is actually possible (such as the formula J), it still remains
much more difficult to find the steps deductively than reductively, for the following reasons:
1. To find out, which of the variables named by Skolem terms are to be turned into
γ- and which in to δ-quantifiers, we have to check whether they were introduced
by instantiation of F (such as the occurrences of mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) in green in J),
or whether they resulted from a further instantiation of a Skolem term already
present in F (such as the occurrences ofmδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) in black in the 2nd line of J).
The former have to be replaced with γ-quantifiers first, so that the side-condition of
the generalized rule of δ−-quantification becomes satisfied for then turning the latter
into δ-quantifiers.
2. Before we can start with the introduction of γ-quantifiers for the instantiated terms
with maximal depth (such as the occurrences of mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) in green in the 3rd
and 4th lines of J , i.e. the quantifier ∀c. in formula K), we may first have to introduce
the γ-quantifiers that occur more innermost (such as the γ-quantifiers for the terms
printed in blue in the formula J, i.e. the quantifiers ∀a., ∀a1., ∀b. in formula K).
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5.3 Mechanical Proof Construction in Heijenoort’s Version of
Herbrand’s Modus Ponens -Free Calculus
Knowing that A has Property C of order 4, we can construct a proof of A in our correction
of Heijenoort’s version of Herbrand’s modus ponens -free calculus also mechanically.
Let N denote the cardinality of T4(F ). Let T4(F ) = {t0, . . . , tN−1}. We have N = 3+
32+(3 + 32)
2
= 156. Therefore, the number of leaf formulas found in the expansion F T4(F )
of the form of the three original ones of F, summed over the three original lines, is N2 +
N3 +N = 3820908.
We can now reduce A mechanically to the huge12 sentential tautology F T4(F ) as follows:
In phase 1, we rename every bound δ-variable to its Skolem term of the δ−-Skolemized
form of F. In phase 2, for every γ-quantifier, we apply the generalized rule of γ-simplification
N−1 times (backward) and associate the terms t0, . . . , tN−1 to the resulting N γ-quantifiers.
Finally, in phase 3, we apply Procedure 5.1 already described in § 5.2 for the reductive
(i.e. backward) application of the generalized rules of δ−- and γ-quantification, including
the renaming of the bound δ-variables. When all quantifiers are removed, we have ob-
tained F T4(F ), and the formal proof is done.
Moreover, because the renaming of the bound δ-variables is actually determined by the
path on which they occur in the formula, the final renaming of bound variables can be done
right after the backward applications of the generalized rule of γ-simplification. Because
our version of the generalized rule of γ-simplification admits variants of H, we can therefore
restrict the renaming bound variables to the very beginning of a reductive proof of A.
This result can be used to give a constructive proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 (From Property C to a Linear Derivation)
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let F be the δ−-Skolemized form of A.
Let n be a positive natural number.
If A has Property C of order n, then we can construct a derivation of A of the following
form, in which we read any term starting with a Skolem function as an atomic variable:
Step 1: We start with the sentential tautology F Tn(F )
(or else with some sub-expansion of F w.r.t. Tn(F ) that is a sentential tautology).
Step 2: Then we may repeatedly apply the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification.
Step 3: Then we may repeatedly apply the generalized rule of γ-simplification.
Step 4: Then we rename all bound δ-variables to obtain A. 
12Note, however, that the Herbrand disjunction used for A in [Wirth &al., 2009; 2014] (instead of
the expansion of the δ−-Skolemized form) is even more than a factor of 107 bigger.
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5.4 Formal Proof in Our Free-Variable Calculus
In this section we do the proof of § 5.2 again, but in our free-variable calculus. So we replace
the generalized rule of δ−-quantification with our generalized rule of δ+
+
-quantification.13
The advantage is not only the possible delay in the choice of witnessing terms,14 but also
that Procedure 5.1 of § 5.2 for restricting the order of applications of the generalized rules of
quantification becomes superfluous and any order will do. Another difference is that now
all Skolem functions are function symbols of the first-order calculus and do not start the
name of a variable anymore. By application of the generalized rule of γ-simplification just
as before twice, we reduce A to the following formula:
∀x. ∀y. ∃m. (x≺m ∧ y≺m)
∧ ∀x1. ∀y1. ∃m1. (x1≺m1 ∧ y1≺m1)
∧ ∀c. ∀b.
(
∀a. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a1. (a1≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a1≺ c)
)
⇒ ∀u. ∀v. ∀w. ∃z. (u≺ z ∧ v≺ z ∧ w≺ z)
(R′)
Note that R′ is similar to the formula R of § 5.2, but lacks the renaming of bound δ-variables
to Skolem terms. As the order of applications of generalized rules of quantification does
not matter anymore, let us remove all consecutively accessible quantifiers of the same kind
and obtain:
∃m. (xγ0≺m ∧ y
γ
0≺m)
∧ ∃m1. (x
γ
1≺m1 ∧ y
γ
1≺m1)
∧ (aγ0≺ b
γ ∧ bγ≺ cγ ⇒ aγ0≺ c
γ)
∧ (aγ1≺ b
γ ∧ bγ≺ cγ ⇒ aγ1≺ c
γ)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(Q′)
If we denote15
(
∃m. (xγ0≺m ∧ y
γ
0≺m), x
γ
0, y
γ
0
)δ
with mδ, then by application of the
generalized rule of δ+
+
-quantification backward to the first line we obtain:
xγ0≺m
δ(xγ0, y
γ
0) ∧ y
γ
0≺m
δ(xγ0, y
γ
0)
∧ ∃m1. (x
γ
1≺m1 ∧ y
γ
1≺m1)
∧ (aγ0≺ b
γ ∧ bγ≺ cγ ⇒ aγ0≺ c
γ)
∧ (aγ1≺ b
γ ∧ bγ≺ cγ ⇒ aγ1≺ c
γ)
⇒ ∃z. (uδ≺ z ∧ vδ≺ z ∧ wδ≺ z)
(L′)
Because ∃m1. (x
γ
1≺m1 ∧ y
γ
1≺m1) results from ∃m. (x
γ
0≺m ∧ y
γ
0≺m) by renaming of
bound variables and by a bijective renaming of free γ-variables via {xγ0 7→x
γ
1, y
γ
0 7→y
γ
1}, we
can use the same function symbol mδ again for the second line. If we also remove the
γ-quantifier in the last line, we obtain:
xγ1≺m
δ(xγ1, y
γ
1) ∧ y
γ
1≺m
δ(xγ1, y
γ
1)
∧ xγ2≺m
δ(xγ2, y
γ
2) ∧ y
γ
2≺m
δ(xγ2, y
γ
2)
∧ (aγ1≺ b
γ
1 ∧ b
γ
1≺ c
γ
1 ⇒ a
γ
1≺ c
γ
1)
∧ (aγ2≺ b
γ
2 ∧ b
γ
2≺ c
γ
2 ⇒ a
γ
2≺ c
γ
2)
⇒ uδ≺ zγ ∧ vδ≺ zγ ∧ wδ≺ zγ
(J ′)
Finally, the sentential tautology J of § 5.2.5 results from J ′ by an appropriate instantiation
of free γ-variables.
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This example proof admits generalization to the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4 (From Property C∗ to a Linear Derivation)
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let F be the δ+
+
-Skolemized form of A.
Let n be a positive natural number.
If A has Property C ∗ of order n,
then we can construct a derivation of A of the following form:
Step 1: We start with a quantifier-free formula B with free γ-variables, such that
— by replacing each free γ-variable xγ occurring in B with a
term txγ (over the free symbols in F and possibly •) with |txγ| ≺ n —
we obtain the sentential tautology F Tn(F )
(or else some sub-expansion of F w.r.t. Tn(F ) that is a sentential tautology).
Step 2: Then we may repeatedly apply the generalized rules of
δ+
+
-quantification and restricted γ-quantification.
Step 3: Then we may repeatedly apply the generalized rule of
γ-simplification to obtain A. 
13Cf. § 3.2.
14Cf. § 3.1.
15For the function δ, see the generalized rule of δ+
+
-quantification in § 3.2, and also Definition 4.3 in § 4.1.
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6 Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem
If we now have a look on what our inference rules do with a formula that has Property C of
order n, then we see that the results of applications of the generalized rules of simplification
and δ−-quantification (and renaming of bound variables) are formulas that have Property C
of order n again.16 Moreover, an application of the generalized rule of γ-quantification where
a term t is replaced with a bound γ-variable in a formula that has Property C of order n
results in a formula that has Property C of order n + |t| .17 Using Corollary 4.7, we can
summarize this as follows:
Lemma 6.1 (From a Linear Derivation to Property C)
If there is a derivation of the rectified first-order formula A from a sentential tautology
by applications of the generalized rules of simplification, and of γ- and δ−-quantification
(and renaming of bound variables),
then A has Property C of order 1 +
m∑
i=1
|ti| ,
where t1, . . . , tm are the instances for the meta-variable t of the generalized rule of
γ-quantification in its m applications in the derivation of A. 
16Indeed, regarding the generalized rule of δ−-quantification, the Skolemization just removes the
δ-quantifier and replaces its bound variable with a constant that occurs at exactly the same places where
the variable occurred free before application of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification. Moreover, regard-
ing the generalized rule of simplification, the expansion of the δ−-Skolemized form of A[H ◦H ′] can be
transformed into S ∨ S′ where S and S′ are the expansions of the δ−-Skolemized forms of A[H ] and A[H ′],
respectively, over the terms that include the Skolem functions of A[H ◦H ′]. Clearly, all or none of S, S′,
S ∨ S′ are sentential tautologies, and the rest follows from Corollary 4.10.
17Note that the replacement seemingly inverting the effect of the application of the generalized rule of
γ-quantification, namely the removal of the new γ-quantifier and the replacement of its bound variable with
the term t would result only in an order of max{n, |t| +1} (because the free variables of t remain free also
after the substitution). This is not a complete inversion, however, because t may occur in the expansion
also as a newly added first argument of Skolem functions. Indeed, the arity of all Skolem functions for
the δ-quantifiers in the scope of the γ-quantifier may be increased; this requires the order n+ |t| in general.
Finally we have max{n, |t| + 1, n+ |t| } = n+ |t| .
For examples of this, consider the formulas of § 5.2: The formula L has Property C of order 2,18 but
the formula O — derived from L by applications the generalized rule of γ-quantification with18 |t| = 1 —
has Property C of order 3. Similarly, the formula P has Property C of order 3 (it has to have the same
order as formula O because it results from it by application of the generalized rule of δ−-quantification), but
the formula Q — derived from P by applications the generalized rule of γ-quantification with |t| = 1 —
has Property C of order 4. In both examples, the order is not increased by inverse substitution of the term t,
because then all formulas would have Property C invariantly of order max{n, |t|+1} = max {n, 2} = n.
The order is increased because the depth of the Skolem term resulting from the previously introduced
δ-quantifier is increased by a newly added first argument.
18In the peculiar notation of § 5.2, where variables are denoted by terms with a Skolem function as
top symbol, this is a bit difficult to see: To show that formula L has Property C of order 2, according
to the substitution σ3, we have to replace the bound δ-variable m
δ(uδ,mδ(vδ, wδ)) with the Skolem con-
stant mδ(uδ,mδ(vδ, wδ)), where the whole overlined term is to be interpreted as the name of the constant.
To show that formula O has Property C, we instantiate the bound δ-variable with the same term in princi-
ple, but now we have to denote this term in the form of mδ(uδ,mδ(vδ, wδ)), where mδ(uδ, ) is the singulary
Skolem function symbol introduced by the expansion, that was a nullary one before, now with the new
argumentmδ(vδ, wδ), which is the name of a variable introduced by the generalized rule of γ-quantification.
This term has height 2; so formula O has Property C of order 3.
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By the similarity of the expansion of the δ+
+
-Skolemized form with the instantiation
of the result of backward applications of the generalized rules of δ+
+
- and restricted
γ-quantification, and by Lemma4.10, we get:
Lemma 6.2 (From a Linear Derivation to Property C∗)
Let n be a positive natural number. Let A be a rectified first-order formula.
If there is a derivation of A
• starting from a quantifier-free formula B with free γ-variables, such that we get a
sentential tautology by replacing each free γ-variable xγ occurring in B with a term txγ
with |txγ| ≺ n,
• proceeding by applications of the generalized rules of simplification and of δ+
+
- and
restricted γ-quantification (and renaming of bound variables),
then A has Property C ∗ of order n. 
As a corollary of Lemmas 5.3 and 6.1, we can now state Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem in the form presented by Heijenoort in [Heijenoort, 1975]:
Theorem 6.3 (Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem à la Heijenoort)
Let A be a rectified first-order formula.
The following two statements are logically equivalent. Moreover, we can construct a witness
for each statement from a witness for the other one.
1. There is a positive natural number n such that A has Property C of order n.
2. There is a sentential tautology B, and
there is a derivation of A from B that consists in applications of the generalized rules of
simplification, γ-quantification, and δ−-quantification
(and in the renaming of bound variables). 
As a corollary of Lemmas 5.4 and 6.2, we can now state Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem in an up-to-date form as follows.
Theorem 6.4 (Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem à la Wirth)
Let A be a rectified first-order formula. Let n be a positive natural number.
The following two statements are logically equivalent. Moreover, we can always construct
witnesses for the second statement if the first one holds.
1. A has Property C ∗ of order n.
2. There is a quantifier-free formula B with free γ-variables, and
there is a substitution σ from these γ-variables to terms t with |t| ≺ n
such that Bσ is a sentential tautology, and
there is derivation of A from B that consists in applications of the generalized rules of
simplification, δ+
+
-quantification, and restricted γ-quantification. 
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7 Generalized Rules of Quantification in the Literature
Regarding Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus, Heijenoort’s invention is restricted
to the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification. Let us briefly discuss their chronology.
• In 1960, Kurt Schütte (1909–1998) published the generalized rules of γ- and
δ−-quantification under the names “S 3” (with a built-in application of the gener-
alized rule of γ-simplification) and “S 2” in his first monograph on proof theory
(in German) [Schütte, 1960, p. 78]. Schütte’s versions, however, come with
an additional restriction regarding the positions where quantifiers may be intro-
duced. Schütte’s top-down definition of positive and negative positions (“Positiv-
teile” and “Negativteile” [Schütte, 1960, p.11]) covers only α-operators (according
to Smullyan’s classification).19 Schütte’s rules restrict the introduction of quan-
tifiers to positions that are either positive or negative in this sense.
• In 1968, the analogs of the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification without
restrictions for a tableau calculus are introduced in Heijenoort’s unpublished
paper [Heijenoort, 1968], under the names “(V′)” and “(IV′)”.
• In 1970, in Bernays’ second20 edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1970, p.166] of Vol. II
of the fundamental work on proof theory, Foundations of Mathematics [Hilbert
& Bernays, 2013a; 2013b] by David Hilbert (1862–1943) and Paul Bernays
(1888–1977), the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification are introduced under
the names “(µ∗)” and “(ν∗)”, but again in a restricted form. Let positive positions
now be defined recursively over α- and β-operators, but without the mutually recur-
sive definition of negative positions.21 Bernays’ rules restrict the introduction of
quantifiers to positive positions in this sense.
• In 1975, Heijenoort introduced the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification
(without restrictions and for a Hilbert calculus) in the unpublished paper [Hei-
jenoort, 1975], which we quoted extensively in § 3.
• In 1977, in his second monograph on proof theory [Schütte, 1977, p. 20], Schütte
published versions of the generalized rules of quantification whose names and restric-
tions are in principle the same as the before-mentioned ones of [Schütte, 1960],
but over a different set of sentential operators: falsehood and implication instead of
conjunction, disjunction, and negation.
• In the 1980s, Heijenoort refers to the generalized rules of γ- and δ−-quantification
in [Heijenoort, 1982; 1986b], but does not define them. See our Note 5.
• In 2009, to the best of our knowledge, the first correct definition of the generalized
rules of γ- and δ−-quantification and (γ-) simplification without restrictions was pub-
lished in our handbook article on Herbrand [Wirth &al., 2009; 2014].
19E.g., in the formula A∧B, the top position is positive, but the positions of the sub-formulas A and B
are neither positive nor negative because a positive ∧ is a β-operator.
20In the first edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939], however, these rules did not occur yet.
21E.g., in the formula A ∧ ¬¬B, the top position and the position of the sub-formulas A and ¬¬B are
positive, but the position of the sub-formulas ¬B and B are neither positive nor negative.
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8 Herbrand’s Original Rules
To see that Heijenoort’s inference rules are not just a slight variation of Herbrand’s
original rules, let us have a look at the latter ones.
Herbrand had only the non-generalized versions of the rules of γ- and δ−-quantifica-
tion, which (just as the non-generalized version of the rule of simplification) result from
our formalization of the generalized rules in § 3 by restricting A[. . .] to the empty context
(i.e. A[Qx. H ], e.g., is just Qx. H). Herbrand introduced them in § 2.2 of his PhD thesis
[Herbrand, 1930]; he named the rules of γ- and δ−-quantification “second” and “first rule
of generalization” [Herbrand, 1971, p. 74f.], respectively (“deuxième” and “première règle
de généralisation” [Herbrand, 1968, p. 68f.]).
At the same places, we also find the (non-generalized) rule of simplification (“règle de
simplification”), modus ponens (“règle d’implication”), and the “rules of passage” (“règles de
passage”). While Herbrand does not need modus ponens for completeness, the deep
inference rules of passage are needed (in anti-prenex direction) because the shallow rules
of quantification — contrary to the generalized ones — cannot introduce quantifiers at
non-top positions.
Rules of Passage: The following six logical equivalences may be used for
rewriting from left to right (prenex direction) and from right to left (anti-prenex
direction), resulting in twelve deep inference rules:
(1) ¬∀x. A ⇔ ∃x. ¬A
(2) ¬∃x. A ⇔ ∀x. ¬A
(3) (∀x. A) ∨ B ⇔ ∀x. (A∨B)
(4) B ∨ ∀x. A ⇔ ∀x. (B∨A)
(5) (∃x. A) ∨ B ⇔ ∃x. (A∨B)
(6) B ∨ ∃x. A ⇔ ∃x. (B∨A)
Here, B is a formula in which the variable x does not occur free.
As explained in § 3, if x occurs free in B, an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences
of x in A is admitted to enable rewriting in prenex direction.
Note that Herbrand did not need rules of passage for conjunction (besides the rules
of passage for negation (1, 2) and for disjunction (3, 4, 5, 6)), because he considered con-
junction A∧B a meta-level notion defined as ¬(¬A∨¬B).
Finally, in § 5.6.A of his PhD Thesis [Herbrand, 1930], Herbrand also introduces
a “generalized rule of simplification” [Herbrand, 1971, p. 175] (“règle de simplification
généralisée” [Herbrand, 1968, p. 143]). It is a deep inference rule for rewriting H ∨ H
to H. Assuming that ¬ and ∨ are the only sentential operators in our formula language,
Herbrand’s rule it is tantamount to Heijenoort’s generalized rule of simplification
presented in § 3.3, because Herbrand implicitly equates the variants H and H ′.
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9 Herbrand’s “False Lemma” and its Corrections
For a given positive natural number n, Herbrand’s “False Lemma” says that Property C
of order n is invariant under the application of the rules of passage.
Herbrand’s “False Lemma” is wrong because the rules of passage may change the
δ−-Skolemized form. This happens whenever a γ-quantifier binding a variable x is moved
over a binary operator whose unchanged operand B contains a δ-quantifier.22
Counterexample 9.1
Let us again consider the rectified formula A of Example 4.12 of § 4, i.e. the formula
∃a.
(
(¬∃b. p(b)) ∨ p(a)
)
, which has the δ−-Skolemized form ∃a.
(
¬p(bδ(a)) ∨ p(a)
)
,
and thus Property C of order 3 (by expansion w.r.t. {•, bδ(•)}), but not Property C of
order 2. Let us move the γ-quantifier “∃a.” inward by applying the last equivalence of
the rules of passage in anti-prenex direction. Then we obtain (¬∃b. p(b)) ∨ ∃a. p(a).
The (δ−- as well as δ+
+
-) Skolemized form of this formula is ¬p(bδ) ∨ ∃a. p(a). Now,
expansion w.r.t. {bδ} results in a sentential tautology. Thus, A has Property C of order 2.

This, however, is not really a counterexample for Herbrand’s “False Lemma” because
Herbrand treated our fresh constant “•” from Definition 4.1 as a variable and defined the
height of a Skolem constant to be 1 (just as we did in Definition 4.1), but the height
of a variable to be 0 (instead of 1), such that |bδ| = 1 = |bδ(•)| . As free variables and
Skolem constants play exactly the same rôle in the given context, Herbrand’s definition
of height is a bit counterintuitive and was possibly introduced to avoid this counterexample.
To find a counterexample for Herbrand’s “False Lemma” also for Herbrand’s definition
of height, we just have to find a way to replace “•” with a Skolem constant, as shown in
the following example.
Counterexample 9.2
Let us take B to be the rectified formula(
(¬∃b. p(b)) ∨ ∃a. q(a)
)
∨
(
(∃x. p(x)) ∧ ¬∃y. q(y)
)
.
The (δ−- as well as δ+
+
-) Skolemized form of B is(
¬p(bδ) ∨ ∃a. q(a)
)
∨
(
(∃x. p(x)) ∧ ¬q(yδ)
)
.
Now, expansion w.r.t. {bδ, yδ} results in a sentential tautology. Thus, B has Property C
of order 2. Let us move the γ-quantifier “∃a.” in formula B outward by applying the last
equivalence of the rules of passage in prenex direction. Then we obtain(
∃a.
(
(¬∃b. p(b)) ∨ q(a)
) )
∨
(
(∃x. p(x)) ∧ ¬∃y. q(y)
)
.
Let us call this formula B′. The δ−-Skolemized (but not the δ+
+
-Skolemized)23 form
of B′ is ( ∃a. ( ¬p(bδ(a)) ∨ q(a) ) ) ∨ ( (∃x. p(x)) ∧ ¬q(yδ) ).
Now the smallest expansion that results in a sentential tautology is the one w.r.t. {yδ, bδ(yδ)}.
Thus, the formula B′ has Property C of order 3, but not of order 2, no matter in which of
the two ways we define the height of variables. 
22Here we use the same meta-variables as in our description of the rules of passage in § 8 and assume
that x does not occur free in B.
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The basic function of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in the proof of Herbrand’s Funda-
mental Theorem is to establish the logical equivalence of Property C of a formula A with
Property C of the prenex and anti-prenex forms of A.
Let us see how this flaw of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” has been corrected.
9.1 Bernays’ Correction
In 1939, Bernays remarked that Herbrand’s proof is hard to follow24 and — for the first
time — published a sound proof of a version of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem. This
version is restricted to prenex form, but more efficient in the number of terms that have to
be considered in a sub-expansion than Herbrand’s quite global limitation to an expansion
w.r.t. all terms t with |t| ≺ n, related to Property C of order n.25
9.2 Gödel’s and Dreben’s Correction
According to a conversation with Heijenoort in autumn1963,26 Kurt Gödel (1906–
1978) noticed the flaw in the proof of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in 1943 and wrote a
private note, but did not publish it. While Gödel’s documented attempts to construct
a counterexample to Herbrand’s “False Lemma” failed, he had actually worked out a
correction of Herbrand’s “False Lemma”, which is sufficient for the proof of Herbrand’s
Fundamental Theorem.27
In 1962, when Gödel’s correction was still unknown, a young student, Peter B.
Andrews (*1937), had the audacity to tell his advisor Alonzo Church (1903–1995)
that there seemed to be a gap in the proof of Herbrand’s “False Lemma”. Church sent
Andrews to Burton Dreben (1927–1999), who finally came up with a counterexample.
And then Andrews constructed a simpler counterexample (similar to the one we presented
in Counterexample 9.2) and joint work found a correction similar to Gödel’s.28
23From this example, one might get the idea that the flaw in Herbrand’s “False Lemma” would be a
peculiarity of the δ−-Skolemized form. Indeed, for the δ+
+
-Skolemized form (cf. Definition 4.3), moving
γ-quantifiers with the rules of passage cannot change the number of arguments of the Skolem functions.
This does not help, however, to overcome the flaw in Herbrand’s “False Lemma”, because, for the δ+
+
-
Skolemized form, moving δ-quantifiers may change the number of arguments of the Skolem functions
if the rule of passage is applied within the scope of a γ-quantifier whose bound variable occurs in B
but not in A (cf. Note 22). The δ+
+
-Skolemized form of ∃y1. ∀z1. p(y1, z1) ∨ ∃y2. ∀z2. q(y2, z2) is
∃y1. p(y1, zδ1(y1)) ∨ ∃y2. q(y2, z
δ
2(y2)), but the δ
+
+
-Skolemized form of any prenex form has a binary
Skolem function, unless we use Henkin quantifiers as found in Hintikka’s first-order logic, cf. [Hintikka,
1996], [Wirth, 2013].
24In both the 1939 edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, Note 1, p.158] and in the 1970 edition [Hilbert
& Bernays, 1970, Note 1, p.161], we read: “Die Herbrandsche Beweisführung ist schwer zu verfolgen”
25Cf. § 3.3 of the 1939 edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939]. In the 1970 edition [Hilbert & Bernays,
1970], Bernays also indicates how to remove the restriction to prenex formulas.
26Cf. [Herbrand, 1968, p. 8, Note j].
27Cf. [Goldfarb, 1993].
28Cf. [Andrews, 2003], [Dreben &al., 1963], [Dreben & Denton, 1963].
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Roughly speaking, the corrected lemma says that — to keep Property C of A invariant
under (a single application of) a rule of passage — we may have to step from order n to
order
n · (N r + 1)n.
Here r is the number of γ-quantifiers in whose scope the rule of passage is applied and
N is the cardinality of Tn(F ) for the δ
−-Skolemized form F of A.29
Gödel’s and Dreben’s correction is not particularly elegant because — iterated several
times until a prenex form is reached — it can lead to pretty high orders. Thus, although this
correction serves well for a finitistic proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, it results
in a complexity that is completely unacceptable in practice (e.g. intractable in automated
reasoning), and this already for small non-prenex formulas.
9.3 Heijenoort’s Correction
The lack of generalized versions of the rules of quantification force Herbrand’s formal
derivations in his modus ponens-free calculus to take a detour over prenex form, which
was standard at Herbrand’s time. For example, Löwenheim and Skolem had always
reduced their problems to prenex forms of various kinds. The reduction of a proof task to
prenex form has several disadvantages, however, such as serious negative effects on proof
complexity.30
The surprising — but, as a matter of fact, correct — thesis of Irving H. Anellis
(1946–2013) in [Anellis, 1991] is that, building on the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem,
it was Herbrand’s work in elaborating Hilbert’s concept of “being a proof” that gave
rise to the development of the variety of first-order calculi in the 1930s, such as the ones
of the Hilbert school [Hilbert & Bernays, 2013b], and such as natural deduction and
sequent calculi in [Gentzen, 1935]. So instead of fiddling around with Hilbert’s ε and
other existing calculi, Herbrand showed that the design of tailor-made calculi suiting the
given situation and its requirements can be most fertile.31
As a consequence of this attitude of Herbrand, if he had become aware of the flaw in
his “False Lemma”, he would probably have avoided the whole detour over prenex forms.
And as there is not much of a choice for this avoidance, he would probably have proceeded in
the way of Heijenoort [1975], which we have presented §§ 3–7. Indeed, not only Heijen-
oort’s generalized rules of quantification are deep inference rules, already Herbrand’s
rules of passage and of generalized simplification were such rules which manipulate formulas
at an arbitrary depth.
29Cf. [Dreben & Denton, 1963, p. 393].
30Cf. e.g. [Baaz & Fermüller, 1995], [Baaz & Leitsch, 1995].
31This is a finding that still today is not sufficiently respected in many areas, especially in those where
logic is applied as a tool. Cf. e.g. [Wirth, 2012d] for a discussion of this topic in the representation and
computation of the semantics of natural language dialogs.
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In Herbrand’s proof of the equivalence of Property C and derivability in Herbrand’s
modus ponens-free calculus (stated in Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem), there is only
one application of Herbrand’s “False Lemma”, namely for dealing with applications of
the rules of passage. As the rules of passage are not part of Heijenoort’s version of
Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus, there is no need for Herbrand’s “False Lemma”
in “Heijenoort’s correction” anymore.
Contrary to Bernays’ correction, Heijenoort’s correction avoids the detour over the
Extended First ε-Theorem of the proof of Bernays mentioned before; cf. Note 25.
Contrary to the Gödel’s and Dreben’s correction, the corrections of Heijenoort
and Bernays have the minor disadvantage32 that they do not provide a corrected version
of Herbrand’s “False Lemma”.
We see a unique quality of Heijenoort’s correction in the following: It corrects exactly
what went wrong in the execution Herbrand’s proof plan. As we have shown in §§ 5
and 6, Herbrand’s original proof of his Fundamental Theorem can easily be adapted to
a proof of its version à la Heijenoort (i.e. our Theorem6.3) (omitting the detour over
prenex form). The idea to such a correction of Herbrand’s proof seems to have been
published first in [Heijenoort, 1971, Note 77, p. 555] and [Herbrand, 1971, Note 60,
p.171], where, however, no generalized versions of the rules of quantification are mentioned.
Moreover, the version of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem à la Heijenoort re-
sulting from Heijenoort’s correction is more elegant and concise than Herbrand’s
original one: It is not only more easily memorized by humans. Also the intractable and un-
intuitive33 rise in complexity introduced by Gödel’s and Dreben’s correction is avoided.
And because the relation to Property C is more straightforward after Heijenoort’s cor-
rection, the Fundamental Theorem à la Heijenoort gives human beings a better chance
to construct a proof of a manageable size from a sub-expansion of the Skolemized form as
we have done in § 5.
Finally, our new free-variable version of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem
(i.e. Theorem6.4) adapts Heijenoort’s correction to our novel free-variable calculus, and
makes the relation to modern reductive free-variable calculi34 for computer-assisted theorem
proving with strong automation support35 most obvious and clear.
32Note that a corrected version of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” (in the sense of Gödel’s and Dreben’s
correction) is still needed if we want to prove that a derivation in Herbrand’s calculus that includes modus
ponens implies Property C in a finitistic sense. As the example on top of page 201 in [Herbrand, 1971]
shows, however, an intractable increase of the order of Property C cannot be avoided in general for inference
steps by modus ponens.
33Unintuitive e.g. in the sense of [Tait, 2006].
34Such as free-variable tableau, sequent, and matrix calculi [Fitting, 1996], [Wirth, 2004; 2013].
35Cf. [Autexier, 2003], [Autexier &al., 2006], [Dietrich, 2011].
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Figure 1: The bridge of the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem and Herbrand’s Fundamen-
tal Theorem, based on the sentential Property C standing firm in the river that divides the
banks of valid and derivable formulas in the land of first-order predicate logic.
10 Why Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem is Central,
Though Not Deep
Right at the beginning of § 3, we have quoted from [Heijenoort, 1975], where Heijen-
oort again quotes a statement of Bernays [1957], saying that Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem would be the central theorem of predicate logic. Heijenoort has quoted this
statement also in [Herbrand, 1968, p.1] and in [Heijenoort, 1976].
Referring to the place of appearance of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in [Her-
brand, 1930, Chapter 5], Heijenoort also ends his article [Heijenoort, 1967] as follows:
“Let me say simply, in conclusion, that Begriffsschrift [Frege, 1879], Löwen-
heim’s paper [Löwenheim, 1915], and Chapter 5 of Herbrand’s thesis [Her-
brand, 1930] are the three cornerstones of modern logic.”
We did not find any place, however, where Heijenoort called Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem “deep” (or “one of the deepest results of logic” as reported by Feferman in
our quotation at the end of § 2).36 Among the statements of Heijenoort we found on
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, closest to “deep” (but not really close) comes the
following sentence in [Heijenoort, 1992, p. 247]:
“In his doctoral dissertation [Herbrand, 1930], Jacques Herbrand (1908–
1931) presented a theorem that revealed a profound feature of first-order logic.”
36We also did not find a French publication of Heijenoort where he calls Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem “profond” (“deep”). This does not mean, of course, that such a publication does not exist, although
we have carefully searched through all English and French texts of Heijenoort listed in our references
(some of them even by machine).
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On the one hand, it is obvious that Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem reveals a profound
feature of first-order logic and that it is one of the cornerstones of modern logic.
On the other hand, however, we cannot really justify why it should be called “deep”,
and agree with Feferman’s statement in our quotation at the end of § 2 that such an
assessment would be “debatable”. In the vernacular of working mathematicians, a “deep
theorem” or “deep result” is a theorem whose proof is very hard to find, especially because it
requires ingenuity,37 such as the proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem (cf. [Taylor & Wiles,
1995], [Wiles, 1995]). Although the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in 1929
was more “avantgarde” than most other proofs in the history of modern logic at their
respective times, and although the theorem itself is ingenious, the proof of Herbrand’s
Fundamental Theorem is not hard to find. As we have seen in § 5, the proof ofHerbrand’s
Fundamental Theorem basically verifies the equivalence of Property C with Herbrand’s
modus ponens-free calculus, which was up to his own design.38 Herbrand was a creative
genius in designing all the novel features he needed for that proof at his time, but we do
not think that all this classifies that proof as being deep in the sense we described here.
Compared to the great achievements of Herbrand in his PhD thesis, the gap in his
original proof is negligible, at least w.r.t. Heijenoort’s correction as discussed in § 9.3.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that he would have been able to patch the gap if he had
only become aware of it. Therefore, we think that this gap does not justify to say that
Herbrand failed to prove his Fundamental Theorem, nor that the theorem is a deep one.
All in all, Heijenoort was definitely right in calling Herbrand a génie créateur
[Herbrand, 1968, p.1], whereas it remains an open question here whether he really called
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem “deep”.
To find out, on the other hand, why Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem should be
called “central”, let us now have a look at a translation ofBernays’ briefly quoted statement
in its context:
“In its proof-theoretic form, Herbrand’s Theorem can be seen as the central
theorem of predicate logic. It expresses the relation of predicate logic to pro-
positional logic in a concise and felicitous form.”39
So it is quite obvious that Bernays did not want to say that Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem is situated in the land of first-order predicate logic like Paris in France;40 he just
wanted to say that it establishes an (in the limit complete) reduction of the problem of
derivability in one calculus to the problem of derivability in a simpler one (a Herbrand
reduction as it is called today), and that this reduction is “concise and felicitous”.41
37A “deep theorem”, however, does not necessarily require computational power, such as in the case of
the very hard proof of the Four-Color Theorem [Gonthier, 2008].
38In terms of Figure 1, we could say that the place where Herbrand’s part of the bridge entered the
bank of derivable formulas in the land of first-order predicate logic was up to Herbrand’s choice.
39The German original text is: “Der Herbrand’sche Satz in seiner beweistheoretischen Fassung kann als
das zentrale Theorem der Prädikatenlogik angesehen werden. In ihm wird die Beziehung der Prädikatenlogik
zur Aussagenlogik auf eine prägnante Form gebracht.”
40You can hardly avoid Paris when traveling in France.
41The original German word “prägnant” (which we translate as “concise and felicitous”) has the same
etymological root as the English word “pregnant”, but it has mostly lost that direct meaning.
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Let us elaborate a bit on the questions why Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem is
central and why the form of its expression is concise and felicitous.
As an explicit notion, Herbrand’s Property C was first formulated in Herbrand’s
thesis [Herbrand, 1930]. Implicitly it was used already before, namely by Leopold
Löwenheim (1878–1957) in [Löwenheim, 1915] and by Thoralf Skolem (1887–1963)
in [Skolem, 1928]. It is the main property of Herbrand’s work and may well be called
the central property of first-order logic, for reasons to be explained in the following.
Contrary to the the unjustified42 criticism of Skolem, Herbrand, and Heijenoort,
there are no essential gaps in the proof of Löwenheim in [Löwenheim, 1915] of the
later so-called Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, which says that Property C is equivalent
to model-theoretic first-order validity. In his PhD thesis, Herbrand also showed the
equivalence of his calculi with those of the Hilbert school [Hilbert & Bernays, 2013b]
and the Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913]. Therefore, as a
consequence of the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, the completeness of all these calculi is
an immediate corollary of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem. But Herbrand did not
trust the left arc of the bridge in our illustration of Figure 1. Herbrand’s standpoint was
so radically finitistic that in the area of logic he did not accept model theory or set theory
at all. And so Gödel proved the completeness of first-order logic first when he submitted
his thesis [Gödel, 1930] in 1929, in the same year as Herbrand, and the theorem is now
called Gödel’s Completeness Theorem in all textbooks on logic.
So, although Property C is purely sentential and does not really belong to the land of
first-order predicate logic with its semantical and syntactical banks (cf. Figure 1), it can be
seen as the central property of first-order predicate logic and Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem connects this property with derivability in the standard calculi. Moreover, the
way this connection is established, is concise and felicitous because the formal proof in
Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus is linear, has the “sub-formula” property, and
does not take any detours because it does not have rules that eliminate intermediate results,
such as modus ponens and Gentzen’s cut rule do. Furthermore, the proof construction of
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem out of Property C gets even more concise and felicitous
in Heijenoort’s correction; cf. § 9.3.
Moreover, Property C has strongly influenced the early history of automated deduction
in the 2ndhalf of the 20th century [Wirth &al., 2009; 2014]. The different treatment of
δ-quantifiers and γ-quantifiers in Property C, namely by Skolemization and expansion,
respectively, as found in [Herbrand, 1930], [Skolem, 1928], rendered the reduction to
sentential logic by hand for small examples (and later with a computer) practically exe-
cutable for the first time.43 This different treatment of the two kinds of quantification is
inherited from the Peirce–Schröder tradition44 which came on Herbrand via Löwen-
42Cf. [Wirth &al., 2009, § 3.12, esp.Note 98] or [Wirth &al., 2014, § 14, esp.Note 114]
43For instance, the elimination of both γ- and δ-quantifiers with the help of Hilbert’s ε-operator suffers
from an exponential complexity in formula size. As a result, already small formulas grow so large that
the mere size makes them inaccessible to human inspection; and this is still the case for the term-sharing
representation of ε-terms of [Wirth, 2008, Example 8], which is further elaborated in [Wirth, 2013, Ex-
ample 3.7].
44For the heritage of Peirce see [Brady, 2000], [Peirce, 1885]; for that of Schröder see [Peckhaus,
2004], [Schröder, 1895].
36
heim and Skolem. Russell and Hilbert had already merged that tradition with the
one of Frege, sometimes emphasizing their Frege heritage over the one of Peirce and
Schröder.45 It was Herbrand who completed the bridge between these two traditions
with his Fundamental Theorem, as depicted in Figure 1.
So one could well say with some justification that, as a consequence of Property C being
the central property of first-order predicate logic, the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem and
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem are the central theorems of first-order predicate logic.
Moreover, Herbrand’s modus ponens-free calculus — at least after Heijenoort’s
correction and our adaption to free-variable calculi — is most close to modern approaches
in automated theorem proving that aim at a synergetic combination of the semantical
strength of human mathematicians with the syntactical and computational strength of
computing machines, as we have indicated already at the end of § 9.3. The manner in
which automated theorem-proving systems based on modern sequent, tableau, and matrix
calculi organize proof search46 does not follow the Hilbert school and their ε-elimination
theorems, but Gentzen’s and Herbrand’s calculi. Moreover, regarding their Skolem-
ization, their deep inference,47 and their focus on γ-quantifiers and their multiplicity, these
modern proof-search calculi are even more in Herbrand’s tradition than in Gentzen’s.
45While this emphasis on Frege will be understood by everybody who ever had the fascinating experience
of reading Frege, it put some unjustified bias to the historiography of modern logic, still present in the
selection of Heijenoort’s famous source book [Heijenoort, 1971]; cf. e.g. [Anellis, 1992, Chapter 3].
46Cf. e.g. [Autexier, 2005], [Wallen, 1990], [Wirth, 2004].
47Note that although the deep inference rules of generalized quantification are an extension of Her-
brand’s calculi by Heijenoort, the deep inference rules of passage and of generalized simplification are
Herbrand’s original contributions.
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11 Conclusion and Future Work
We have most clearly described and discussed Heijenoort’s version ofHerbrand’smodus
ponens-free calculus and its relation to Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in §§ 3–6,
where our presentation had a didactical focus because (as stated already in § 1) we hope
that our improvements of this calculus will become part of the standard education of logi-
cians, just as well as the famous construction of Cut-free proofs according to Gentzen’s
Hauptsatz [Gentzen, 1935].
Already from our brief discussion in § 7 on the publication history of the generalized rules
of quantification alone, it becomes clear that Heijenoort’s unpublished handout [Hei-
jenoort, 1975] would have deserved publication in an international journal, provided that
Heijenoort had worked out the proof properly, involving our correction of Heijenoort’s
generalized rule of simplification.48
After clarifying Herbrand’s original rules in § 8, it became possible to discuss
Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in § 9: After briefly describing Bernays’, Gödel’s, and
Dreben’s corrections, we explained why we think that “Heijenoort’s correction”
(consisting in the material we presented in §§ 3–6) is actually the one that fits Herbrand’s
style in his work on logic best and offers the most tractable solution, which also has a close
relation to automated and human-oriented theorem proving.
Finally, in § 10, we have checked in which context Bernays called Herbrand’s Fun-
damental Theorem “central” and — to defend Heijenoort’s and Bernays’ assessment
of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem against Feferman’s critique quoted at the end
of § 2 — elaborated on the question why its form of expression is “concise and felicitous”,
though not deep.
The strong dependencies
1. between the δ−-Skolemized form and the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem (actually Lemma5.3) described in § 5.2, and
2. between the δ+
+
-Skolemized form and the liberalized δ-rule in the form of our gen-
eralized rule of δ+
+
-quantification (which forced us to introduce Property C∗ in Defi-
nition 4.6),
became clear only in this article and may deserve further consideration.
A careful bilingual edition of Herbrand’s complete works on the basis of the previous
editorial achievements [Herbrand, 1936; 1971], which was on the agenda until Heijen-
oort died [Feferman, 1993b, p. 383], is still in high demand.
Last but not least, we would like to suggest our handbook article [Wirth &al., 2009;
2014] for further reading on Herbrand’s work in logic, also because a comparison with
the material we have further elaborated in this article will make some additional aspects of
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem clear.49
48That this proof would have been within Heijenoort’s reach is out of question; although he had not
worked it out, as we can see from the bug in his generalized rule of simplification.
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my open questions.
49For example, as indicated already in our quotation from Heijenoort’s [Heijenoort, 1975] at the
beginning of § 2, besides the expansions used in this article (nowadays called “Herbrand expansions”),
there is the alternative of Herbrand disjunctions used in [Wirth &al., 2009; 2014]. Considering the
intractable size of a Herbrand disjunction compared to a Herbrand expansion (cf. Note 12), we have
come to the conclusion that expansions should be preferred in general, not only because they are Her-
brand’s own choice, but also because they are more intuitive and more tractable, especially in combination
with the “sub-expansions” we have introduced in Definition 4.2. This means, for instance, that presenta-
tions of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem via Herbrand disjunctions, such as in [Heijenoort, 1992,
pp. 247–249], should be avoided because they are none of the following: historically adequate, tractable,
intuitive.
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